Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size
U of London Queen Mary Economics Working Paper No. 436
17 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2001
Date Written: May 1, 2001
Abstract
It is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although altruism takes the form of unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason is that altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish voluntary contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. It is also shown that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups.
Keywords: Free riding, Public good, Altruism
JEL Classification: D64, H4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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