Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States

71 Pages Posted: 11 May 2016

See all articles by Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Luc Laeven

European Central Bank (ECB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Gustavo Suarez

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 11, 2016

Abstract

We present evidence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on banks’ internal ratings on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve’s survey of terms of business lending. We find that ex-ante risk taking by banks (measured by the risk rating of new loans) is negatively associated with increases in short-term interest rates. This relationship is more pronounced in regions that are less in sync with the nationwide business cycle, and less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods of financial distress.

Keywords: Interest rates, monetary policy, banks, leverage, risk

JEL Classification: E43, E52, G21

Suggested Citation

Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni and Laeven, Luc A. and Suarez, Gustavo, Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States (May 11, 2016). ECB Working Paper No. 1903, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2778581

Giovanni Dell'Ariccia (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-8135 (Phone)
202-623-4352 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Luc A. Laeven

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Gustavo Suarez

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
269
Abstract Views
1,189
rank
97,242
PlumX Metrics