Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Is the Anti-Corruption Campaign Effective at Reducing Corporate Corruption in China?

103 Pages Posted: 20 May 2016 Last revised: 30 Oct 2017

John M. Griffin

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance

Clark Liu

Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance

Tao Shu

University of Georgia - Department of Finance

Date Written: October 19, 2017

Abstract

Chinese firms with characteristics commonly associated with poor governance and corporate self-dealing are more likely to have their executives investigated by the anti-corruption campaign. Local connections and specific affiliations with investigated politicians are associated with more investigations, but specific affiliations with non-investigated politicians and current leaders decrease investigation likelihood. Chinese firms in general exhibit little overall decrease in measures of potential corporate corruption with the exception of heavily scrutinized entertainment expenditures. Overall, our findings suggest that the campaign targets corrupt managers, appears influenced by political favoritism, and has not broadly affected Chinese corporate culture.

Keywords: Anti-Corruption Campaign, China, Corrupt Managers, Corrutpion Measures, Corporate Culture

Suggested Citation

Griffin, John M. and Liu, Clark and Shu, Tao, Is the Anti-Corruption Campaign Effective at Reducing Corporate Corruption in China? (October 19, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2779429 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2779429

John Griffin

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )

Red McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-6621 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jgriffin.info

Clark Liu

Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance ( email )

No. 43, Chengdu Road
Haidian District
Beijing 100083
China

Tao Shu (Contact Author)

University of Georgia - Department of Finance ( email )

Department of Finance
Terry College of Business, University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
461
Rank
51,980
Abstract Views
1,311