Can Incentives to Generic Manufacturers Save Doha's Paragraph 6?

Abstract

A primary objective of the Doha Declaration was to create a process for member countries with insufficient manufacturing capabilities to access generic versions of patented drugs without violating TRIPS intellectual property standards. This year marks the tenth anniversary of the process. Referred to as the “Paragraph 6 compulsory licenses provisions,” this first and only amendment to TRIPS was intended to ensure developing countries access to affordable medicines. Over the past decade, these provisions have failed to provide the gains initially anticipated. This Article explores the reasons for this failure and suggests that an under-examined approach to reaching the Doha Declaration’s goal lies in reframing the role of generic manufacturers in the Paragraph 6 process. More specifically, the current health challenges facing many developing countries call for a compulsory licensing framework that realigns legal and business incentives to encourage generic manufacturers to become primary drivers in delivering necessary medicines to developing countries through Paragraph 6 provisions. This Article proposes such a framework.