The Logic of Authoritarian Political Selection: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in China
57 Pages Posted: 22 May 2016 Last revised: 22 Nov 2021
Date Written: May 20, 2018
Political selection is important to authoritarian regime survival. Although selection outcomes are often observed, it is difficult to decipher elites' logic of decision-making due to their multidimensional preference and the opaque process. Employing a conjoint experiment conducted among over 300 government officials in China, this paper unpacks multidimensional elite preference in entry-level political selection. It finds that while elites comply with institutional norms by selecting candidates based on competence and loyalty, they also take into account personal preference by favoring those with political connections. Kinship ties to government increase a candidate's chance by over 20 percentage points, even though the candidate is not deemed more competent or loyal. These findings demonstrate that authoritarian elites do not always follow the logic of regime survival; there exists an agency problem in political selection that could undermine the effectiveness of the ruling class over time.
Keywords: political selection, authoritarianism, political connections, meritocracy
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation