Between Judicial Oligarchy and Parliamentary Supremacy: Understanding the Court's Dilemma in Constitutional Judicial Review

29 Pages Posted: 17 May 2016 Last revised: 29 Sep 2016

See all articles by Seow Hon Tan

Seow Hon Tan

Singapore Management University - Yong Pung How School of Law

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

This article considers the dilemma that constitutional judicial review presents to the most well-meaning of judges — that of navigating the narrow and difficult road between parliamentary supremacy and judicial oligarchy. It examines the Singapore Court of Appeal’s delineation of legal and extra-legal considerations in view of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of adjudication in determining the constitutionality of section 377A of the Penal Code in Lim Meng Suang v. Attorney General. It proposes an alternative natural law approach to constitutional judicial review based on Radbruch’s formula, which helps courts to avoid the pitfalls of judicial idiosyncrasies and usurpation of legislative mandate while staying true to constitutionalism.

Suggested Citation

Tan, Seow Hon, Between Judicial Oligarchy and Parliamentary Supremacy: Understanding the Court's Dilemma in Constitutional Judicial Review (2016). [2016] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 307-335, September 2016 Singapore Management University School of Law Research Paper No. 8/2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2780732 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2780732

Seow Hon Tan (Contact Author)

Singapore Management University - Yong Pung How School of Law ( email )

55 Armenian Street
Singapore, 179943
Singapore

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