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Patent Institutions: Shifting Interactions Between Legal Actors

Research Handbook – Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, Volume 1 – Theory, Forthcoming

Duke I&E Research Paper No. 16-15

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2016-30

19 Pages Posted: 20 May 2016 Last revised: 6 Jun 2016

Arti K. Rai

Duke University School of Law; Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

Date Written: May 17, 2016

Abstract

This contribution to the Research Handbook on Economics of Intellectual Property Rights (Vol. 1 Theory) addresses interactions between the principal legal institutions of the U.S. patent system. It considers legal, strategic, and normative perspectives on these interactions as they have evolved over the last 35 years. Early centralization of power by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, newly created in 1982, established a regime dominated by the appellate court's bright-line rules. More recently, aggressive Supreme Court and Congressional intervention have respectively reinvigorated patent law standards and led to significant devolution of power to inferior tribunals, including newly created tribunals like the USPTO's Patent Trial and Appeals Board. This new era in institutional interaction creates a host of fresh empirical and normative research questions for scholars. The contribution concludes by outlining a research agenda.

Suggested Citation

Rai, Arti K., Patent Institutions: Shifting Interactions Between Legal Actors (May 17, 2016). Research Handbook – Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, Volume 1 – Theory, Forthcoming; Duke I&E Research Paper No. 16-15; Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2016-30. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2781312

Arti Kaur Rai (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative ( email )

215 Morris St., Suite 300
Durham, NC 27701
United States

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