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Individual Sanctions for Competition Law Infringements: Pros, Cons and Challenges

35 Pages Posted: 21 May 2016 Last revised: 30 Jun 2016

Florian Wagner-von Papp

University College London Faculty of Laws; University of the German Federal Armed Forces - Helmut Schmidt Universität

David Viros

Autorité de la Concurrence

Daniel Zimmer

University of Bonn - Institut für Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht; University of Bonn - Centre for Advanced Studies in Law and Economics (CASTLE)

William E. Kovacic

George Washington University - Law School; King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of Law

Andreas Stephan

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy

Date Written: May 17, 2016

Abstract

Following the substantive harmonization in Regulation (EC) no. 1/2003, the European Commission has started more recently to focus on the harmonization of procedure and sanctions, and in January 2016, the European Parliament called for penalties against natural persons. This special issue looks at the current state of individual sanctions on the EU Member State level, examines from a comparative perspective the institutional challenges which these individual sanctions present, especially for leniency programmes, and discusses the pros and cons of introducing further individual, in particular criminal sanctions in Europe. It examines the experience with criminal sanctions in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, and presents empirical evidence on public attitudes towards competition law infringements in various Member States and the United States.

Keywords: Antitrust, Competition Law, individual sanctions, criminal sanctions, leniency, enforcement

JEL Classification: K21, K42, K14, L41

Suggested Citation

Wagner-von Papp, Florian and Viros, David and Zimmer, Daniel and Kovacic, William E. and Stephan, Andreas, Individual Sanctions for Competition Law Infringements: Pros, Cons and Challenges (May 17, 2016). Concurrences Review N° 2-2016, Art. N° 78515, pp. 14-44; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2016-26; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-26. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2782090

Florian Wagner-von Papp (Contact Author)

University College London Faculty of Laws ( email )

Bidborough House
38-50 Bidborough Street
London WC1H 9BT, WC1H 9BT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://iris.ucl.ac.uk/iris/browse/profile?upi=FWAGN21

University of the German Federal Armed Forces - Helmut Schmidt Universität ( email )

Holstenhofweg 85
Hamburg, 22008
Germany

David Viros

Autorité de la Concurrence ( email )

11, rue de l'Echelle
Paris, 75001
France

Daniel Zimmer

University of Bonn - Institut für Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht ( email )

Adenauerallee 24 - 42
Bonn, NRW 53113
Germany
+49228739108 (Phone)
+49228739111 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jura.uni-bonn.de/institut-fuer-handels-und-wirtschaftsrecht/institut/

University of Bonn - Centre for Advanced Studies in Law and Economics (CASTLE) ( email )

Adenauerallee 24 - 42
Bonn, NRW 53113
Germany
+49228735803 (Phone)
+49228739111 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jura.uni-bonn.de/castle/

William E. Kovacic

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202.994.8123 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.gwu.edu/faculty/profile.aspx?id=1731

King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of Law

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

Andreas Stephan

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )

UEA
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom

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