Entrenchment Illusion: The Curious Case of Egypt's Constitutional Entrenchment Clause

Abstract

Constitutional architects usually include in constitutional texts an unamendable clause known as constitutional entrenchment. A constitutional entrenchment serves different purposes such as, shielding and preserving high valued constitutional norms and distancing the state from past autocratic practices. The study of constitutional entrenchment has attracted great attention in recent years since it restricts the power of constitutional amendment and thus the basic concepts of democracy. This article aims to provide a critical analysis to the entrenchment clause of Egypt’s current Constitution of 2014 through tracing constitutional entrenchment in different comparative jurisdictions. In doing so, the article examines the paradoxical-unprecedented language of Egypt’s constitutional entrenchment clause and its significance on the entire constitutional structure for being non-self-entrenchment. The article also discusses the position of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court regarding reviewing the constitutionality of constitutional amendments and acts.