False Friends? Empirical Evidence on Trade Policy Substitution in Regional Trade Agreements

43 Pages Posted: 24 May 2016 Last revised: 9 Sep 2017

Date Written: May 23, 2016

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the interplay of regional economic integration and the use of bilateral antidumping (AD) measures. Our empirical analysis brings three central findings to light: (i) We find that regional trade agreements (RTAs) generally reduce the likelihood of AD activity among integration partners. (ii) In addition, an improvement in the tariff treatment between trading partners — regardless of whether expressed as the directly faced tariff or as a tariff margin — generally leads to a lower likelihood of bilateral AD activity. (iii) Regarding the interaction of both events, however, a reciprocally higher tariff margin between integration partners leads to a higher likelihood of bilateral AD activity than an equal tariff margin among non-integration trading partners. The latter effect seems to be primarily driven by those RTAs with a participation of “South” countries.

Keywords: Antidumping, trade liberalization, regional economic integration, tariff margin, panel data, probit

JEL Classification: F13, F14, F15

Suggested Citation

Silberberger, Magdalene and Stender, Frederik, False Friends? Empirical Evidence on Trade Policy Substitution in Regional Trade Agreements (May 23, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2783234 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2783234

Magdalene Silberberger

University Witten/Herdecke ( email )

Alfred-Herrhausen-Straße 50
Witten, 58448
Germany
+49 (0)2302 / 926-509 (Phone)

Frederik Stender (Contact Author)

Ruhr University of Bochum ( email )

Faculty of Management and Economics
Chair of International Economics
Bochum, 44780
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
55
Abstract Views
596
Rank
586,752
PlumX Metrics