Discriminatory Auctions with Seller Discretion: Evidence from German Treasury Auctions

60 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2016

See all articles by Jörg Rocholl

Jörg Rocholl

ESMT European School of Management and Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: 2005

Abstract

This paper examines the results of 93 discriminatory German Treasury auctions between

Keywords: Discriminatory auctions, Winner's curse, Seller discretion

JEL Classification: H63, G28

Suggested Citation

Rocholl, Joerg, Discriminatory Auctions with Seller Discretion: Evidence from German Treasury Auctions (2005). Bundesbank Series 1 Discussion Paper No. 2005,15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2785101

Joerg Rocholl (Contact Author)

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.esmt.org/en/159244

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
6
Abstract Views
197
PlumX Metrics