Organizational Complexity and Balance Sheet Management in Global Banks

38 Pages Posted: 31 May 2016 Last revised: 11 Nov 2017

See all articles by Nicola Cetorelli

Nicola Cetorelli

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Linda S. Goldberg

Federal Reserve Bank of New York; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2016-03-01

Abstract

Banks have progressively evolved from being standalone institutions to being subsidiaries of increasingly complex financial conglomerates. We conjecture and provide evidence that the organizational complexity of the family of a bank is a fundamental driver of the business model of the bank itself, as reflected in the management of the bank’s own balance sheet. Using micro-data on global banks with branch operations in the United States, we show that branches of conglomerates in more complex families have a markedly lower lending sensitivity to funding shocks. The balance sheet management strategies of banks are very much determined by the structure of the organizations the banks belong to. The complexity of the conglomerate can change the scale of the lending channel for a large global bank by more than 30 percent.

Keywords: global bank, liquidity, transmission, internal capital market, organization, complexity

JEL Classification: E44, F36, G32

Suggested Citation

Cetorelli, Nicola and Goldberg, Linda S., Organizational Complexity and Balance Sheet Management in Global Banks (2016-03-01). FRB of NY Staff Report No. 772. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2786191

Nicola Cetorelli (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
212-720-5071 (Phone)
212-720-8363 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://nyfedeconomists.org/cetorelli/

Linda S. Goldberg

Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
212-720-2836 (Phone)
212-720-6831 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
18
Abstract Views
291
PlumX Metrics