Regulatory Enforcement, Riskscapes, and Environmental Justice

44 Pages Posted: 31 May 2016

See all articles by David Konisky

David Konisky

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA)

Christopher M. Reenock

Florida State University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: May 17, 2016

Abstract

Does environmental regulation vary over poor and minority communities? An uneven governmental response may follow from regulators’ varying incentives to negotiate enforcement challenges. We argue that regulators confront two in particular. Regulators can pursue political enforcement, responding to mobilized interests, regardless of environmental risk, or they can pursue instrumental enforcement, responding to at risk communities, regardless of political mobilization. To examine these competing strategies, we use an original dataset from the EPA’s Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) model to develop a geographic “riskscape” combined with census tract community data and facility-level enforcement data. We find that state regulatory agencies pursue a mixture of political and instrumental enforcement but that these tactics are applied unevenly across traditional environmental justice communities. Poor communities and those exposed to higher risks attract regulatory attention, while African American and Hispanic communities do not. Importantly, inattention to Hispanic communities is not mediated by the relative risk levels they face.

Keywords: Environmental Justice, Risk, Regulation, Policy Implementation

Suggested Citation

Konisky, David and Reenock, Christopher M., Regulatory Enforcement, Riskscapes, and Environmental Justice (May 17, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2786362 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2786362

David Konisky (Contact Author)

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA) ( email )

1315 East Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

Christopher M. Reenock

Florida State University - Department of Political Science ( email )

567 Bellmy Building
Tallahassee, FL 32306
United States
850-644-4542 (Phone)
850-644-1367 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mailer.fsu.edu/~creenock/

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