Money Market Discipline and Central Bank Lending

40 Pages Posted: 30 May 2016

See all articles by Marie Hoerova

Marie Hoerova

European Central Bank (ECB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Cyril Monnet

University of Bern

Date Written: May 12, 2016


This paper provides a theory for the joint existence of lending on decentralized money markets (secured or unsecured) and lending by a central bank. There is endogenous adverse selection in the sense that banks choose the quality of their investments, which is private information. When banks need to refinance their investments, the bargaining solution on the unsecured money market eliminates excessive risk-taking, at the cost of terminating some investments that would have been continued under full information. The secured market eliminates excessive risk-taking by forcing borrowers to pledge collateral, at the cost of reducing the scale of productive investments. When there is aggregate liquidity risk, we show that the joint existence of money markets (be it secured or unsecured) and central bank lending improves upon money markets alone. However, without aggregate risk, central bank lending can only make matters worse by reducing market discipline.

Keywords: Asymmetric information, Money market, Rationing, Collateral, Central bank

JEL Classification: E58, G01, G21

Suggested Citation

Hoerova, Marie and Monnet, Cyril, Money Market Discipline and Central Bank Lending (May 12, 2016). Available at SSRN: or

Marie Hoerova (Contact Author)

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314


Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

United Kingdom

Cyril Monnet

University of Bern ( email )

Gesellschaftsstrasse 49
Bern, BERN 3001

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