Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-Linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule

29 Pages Posted: 6 Jun 2016

See all articles by Yu Zhou

Yu Zhou

Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, Students

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: May 27, 2016

Abstract

We consider the allocation problem of assigning heterogeneous objects to a group of agents and determining how much they should pay. Each agent receives at most one object. Agents have non-quasi-linear preferences over bundles, each consisting of an object and a payment. Especially, we focus on the cases: (i) objects are linearly ranked, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer a higher ranked object to a lower ranked one, and (ii) objects are partitioned into several tiers, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer an object in the higher tier to an object in the lower tier. The minimum price rule assigns a minimum price (Walrasian) equilibrium to each preference profile. We establish: (i) on a common-object-ranking domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy, and (ii) on a common-tiered-object domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying these four axioms.

Keywords: strategy-proofness, efficiency, non-quasi-linearity, minimum price rule, common-object-ranking domain, common-tiered-object domain

JEL Classification: D44, D61, D71, D82

Suggested Citation

Zhou, Yu and Serizawa, Shigehiro, Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-Linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule (May 27, 2016). ISER Discussion Paper No. 971, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2786789 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2786789

Yu Zhou

Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, Students ( email )

1-7 Machikaneyama
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Japan
08038157212 (Phone)

Shigehiro Serizawa (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8558 (Phone)
+81 6 6878 2766 (Fax)

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