Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism

54 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2016

See all articles by Rui A. Albuquerque

Rui A. Albuquerque

Boston College, Carroll School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Zicheng Lei

University of Surrey - Finance and Accounting Group

Jörg Rocholl

ESMT European School of Management and Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Chendi Zhang

University of Exeter Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2016

Abstract

The landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission asserts for the first time that corporations benefit from First Amendment protection regarding freedom of speech in the form of independent political expenditures, thus creating a new avenue for political activism. This paper studies how corporations adjusted their political activism in response to this ruling. The paper presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis that institutional investors, in particular public pension funds, have a preference for not using the new avenue for political activism, a preference not shared by other investors.

JEL Classification: G3

Suggested Citation

Albuquerque, Rui A. and Lei, Zicheng and Rocholl, Joerg and Zhang, Chendi, Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism (May 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11301, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2786903

Rui A. Albuquerque (Contact Author)

Boston College, Carroll School of Management ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States

HOME PAGE: http://ruialbuquerque.webs.com

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Zicheng Lei

University of Surrey - Finance and Accounting Group ( email )

63MS02, Rik Medlik Building
Surrey Business School
Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom
01483686372 (Phone)

Joerg Rocholl

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.esmt.org/en/159244

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Chendi Zhang

University of Exeter Business School ( email )

Streatham Court
Xfi Building, Rennes Dr.
Exeter, EX4 4JH
United Kingdom

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