Collaboration in Strategic Alliances: Cooperation and Coordination

Collaborative Strategy: Critical Issues for Alliances and Networks, Luiz Mesquita, Roberto Ragozzino, and Jeffrey J. Reuer (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Forthcoming

14 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2016

See all articles by Tobias Kretschmer

Tobias Kretschmer

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Bart Vanneste

University College London

Date Written: February 2, 2016

Abstract

Strategic alliances are set up to foster collaboration that cannot be achieved through market transactions. In fact, collaboration is often considered the defining feature of alliances — that is, “voluntary arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, or codevelopment of products, technologies, or services” (Gulati, 1998: 293). However, many alliances yield disappointing results due to a breakdown in collaboration (Kale and Singh, 2009). Such breakdown may occur due to failures in cooperation or in coordination (Gulati, Lawrence, and Puranam, 2005; Gulati and Singh, 1998). Cooperation is the alignment of incentives, or the extent to which partners are willing to work together. Cooperation is not guaranteed because alliance partners maintain their separate goals. Failures of cooperation can occur for example if synergies are one-sided (i.e., only one partner benefits) or if partners are also each other’s competitor.

Keywords: Strategic alliances, collaboration, cooperation, coordination

Suggested Citation

Kretschmer, Tobias and Vanneste, Bart, Collaboration in Strategic Alliances: Cooperation and Coordination (February 2, 2016). Collaborative Strategy: Critical Issues for Alliances and Networks, Luiz Mesquita, Roberto Ragozzino, and Jeffrey J. Reuer (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2788087

Tobias Kretschmer

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management) ( email )

Kaulbachstr. 45
Munich, DE 80539
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Bart Vanneste (Contact Author)

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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