Managerial Learning from Analyst Feedback to Voluntary Capex Guidance, Investment Efficiency and Firm Performance

Management Science forthcoming

79 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2016 Last revised: 12 Nov 2020

See all articles by Jihun Bae

Jihun Bae

City University London

Gary C. Biddle

University of Melbourne - Faculty of Business and Economics; Columbia Business School; HKU Business School; London Business School

Chul W. Park

The University of Hong Kong - School of Business

Date Written: October 10, 2020

Abstract

We test predictions that managers issuing voluntary capex guidance learn from analyst feedback
and that this learning enhances investment efficiency and firm performance (Langberg and
Sivaramakrishnan, 2010). Our findings are consistent with these predictions. First, we find that
managers’ capex adjustments and capex guidance revisions relate positively with analyst feedback
measured by differences between post-guidance analyst capex forecasts and managerial capex
guidance. Second, changes in investment efficiency relate positively with analyst feedback. Third,
subsequent firm financial performance relates positively with the predicted values of both
managers’ capex adjustments and capex guidance revisions. These findings extend prior evidence
regarding sources of managerial learning and investment efficiency and help to explain the active
issuance of voluntary guidance by managers in settings where, as for capex guidance, the potential
for managerial learning from related share price effects is limited.

Keywords: Voluntary guidance, analyst feedback, managerial learning, investment efficiency, firm performance

JEL Classification: M41

Suggested Citation

Bae, Jihun and Biddle, Gary C. and Park, Chul Won, Managerial Learning from Analyst Feedback to Voluntary Capex Guidance, Investment Efficiency and Firm Performance (October 10, 2020). Management Science forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2788381 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2788381

Jihun Bae

City University London

106 Bunhill Row
London EC1Y 8TZ
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom

Gary C. Biddle (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Level 8, Dept of Accounting
198 Berkeley Street, Carlton
Melbourne, Victoria 3010 3010
Australia
61-3-8344-9807 (Phone)
61-3-9349-2397 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://findanexpert.unimelb.edu.au/profile/774767-gary-biddle

Columbia Business School ( email )

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New York, NY 10027
United States

HKU Business School ( email )

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London Business School ( email )

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London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Chul Won Park

The University of Hong Kong - School of Business ( email )

Meng Wah Complex
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
China
+852-2859-1081 (Phone)

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