Investor Psychology in Capital Markets: Evidence and Policy Implications

Dice Center WP 2001-10

94 Pages Posted: 14 Aug 2001

See all articles by Kent D. Daniel

Kent D. Daniel

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

David Hirshleifer

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Siew Hong Teoh

UCLA Anderson School of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2001

Abstract

We review extensive evidence about how psychological biases affect investor behavior and prices. Systematic mispricing probably causes substantial resource misallocation. We argue that limited attention and overconfidence cause investor credulity about the strategic incentives of informed market participants. However, individuals as political participants remain subject to the biases and self-interest they exhibit in private settings. Indeed, correcting contemporaneous market pricing errors is probably not government's relative advantage. Government and private planners should establish rules ex ante to improve choices and efficiency, including disclosure, reporting, advertising, and default-option- setting policies. Especially, government should avoid actions that exacerbate investor biases.

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G18, G28, G38, M41

Suggested Citation

Daniel, Kent D. and Hirshleifer, David and Teoh, Siew Hong, Investor Psychology in Capital Markets: Evidence and Policy Implications (July 2001). Dice Center WP 2001-10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=278848 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.278848

Kent D. Daniel

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

David Hirshleifer (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department ( email )

Marshall School of Business
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.uci.edu/dhirshle/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Siew Hong Teoh

UCLA Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty-and-research/accounting/faculty/teoh

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