Corporate Governance and Equity Prices

67 Pages Posted: 12 Sep 2001  

Paul A. Gompers

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Joy L. Ishii

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Andrew Metrick

Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Abstract

Shareholder rights vary across firms. Using the incidence of 24 unique governance rules, we construct a "Governance Index" to proxy for the level of shareholder rights at about 1500 large firms during the 1990s. An investment strategy that bought firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sold firms in the highest decile of the index (weakest rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during the sample period. We find that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions.

Keywords: Corporate governance, shareholder rights, investor protection, agency problems, entrenched management, hostile takeovers, poison pills, golden parachutes, greenmail

JEL Classification: G34, G14

Suggested Citation

Gompers, Paul A. and Ishii, Joy L. and Metrick, Andrew, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 107-155, February 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=278920 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.278920

Paul A. Gompers

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6297 (Phone)
617-496-8443 (Fax)

Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02163
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Joy L. Ishii

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Andrew Metrick (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management ( email )

165 Whitney Avenue
New Haven, CT 06511
United States
(203)-432-3069 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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