Is the Erosion Thesis Overblown? Alignment from Without in Germany

29 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2016

See all articles by John T. Addison

John T. Addison

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Paulino Teixeira

Universidade de Coimbra - Faculdade de Economia; Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Katalin Evers

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - Institute for Employment Research (IAB)

Lutz Bellmann

Institute for Employment Research (IAB); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Date Written: July 2016

Abstract

It is sometimes alleged that collective bargaining coverage in Germany is understated because uncovered firms “orient” themselves toward sectoral agreements. In fact, although orientation has grown as sectoral bargaining has declined, their joint frequency has fallen. Further, where orientation occurs at firms that leave a sectoral agreement, it provides only partial compensation. The small deficits involved, in conjunction with some indirect evidence on joiners, suggest some modest attenuation of the undoubted decline in collective bargaining.

Suggested Citation

Addison, John T. and Teixeira, Paulino and Evers, Katalin and Bellmann, Lutz, Is the Erosion Thesis Overblown? Alignment from Without in Germany (July 2016). Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 55, Issue 3, pp. 415-443, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2789209 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/irel.12144

John T. Addison (Contact Author)

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

The Francis M. Hipp Building
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803-777-6876 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mooreschool.sc.edu/moore/economics/profiles/addison.htm

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Paulino Teixeira

Universidade de Coimbra - Faculdade de Economia ( email )

Av. Dias da Silva, 165
Coimbra, 3004-512
Portugal

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany

Katalin Evers

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - Institute for Employment Research (IAB) ( email )

Lutz Bellmann

Institute for Employment Research (IAB) ( email )

Regensburger Str. 104
Nuremberg, 90478
Germany
+49 911 179 3046 (Phone)
+49 911 179 3297 (Fax)

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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