Adios Embargo: The Case for Executive Termination of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba

American Business Law Journal, Forthcoming

Fox School of Business Research Paper No. 16-027

45 Pages Posted: 6 Jun 2016 Last revised: 16 Dec 2016

Kevin J. Fandl

Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management

Date Written: June 3, 2016

Abstract

The United States and Cuba have a long history of tumultuous relations, including overt and covert interventions, trade disputes, and migration crises. Yet it was the rise of the Castro regime on the island that cemented the frustration of relations between the neighboring countries. Shortly after Castro’s seizure of power, the United States began using executive power to reinstall some form of democratic governance. And though each subsequent administration modified their approach toward Cuba, some form of executive embargo has existed since the Kennedy regime. But as with all executive power, a new administration maintains the flexibility to modify previous acts in light of new circumstances. Only congress can remove this control through the promulgation of statutes, which is what they did with two statutes enacted in the 1990s. This codification effectively cemented the U.S.-Cuba embargo and tied the executive’s hands in managing relations with the island. In this article, I contend that the foreign affairs power laid upon the executive through the Constitution grants that office broad control over political and economic relations with foreign states, including power over embargos. Thus, I posit that no congressional approval is required for the executive to lift the embargo against Cuba and normalize relations with the island.

Suggested Citation

Fandl, Kevin J., Adios Embargo: The Case for Executive Termination of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba (June 3, 2016). American Business Law Journal, Forthcoming; Fox School of Business Research Paper No. 16-027. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2789819

Kevin J. Fandl (Contact Author)

Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
2027255305 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.globallegaled.com

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