An Online Appendix to 'Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy'

2 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2016 Last revised: 26 Dec 2017

See all articles by Steven Lalley

Steven Lalley

Department of Statistics, University of Chicago

E. Glen Weyl

Microsoft Research New York City; RadicalxChange Foundation

Date Written: December 24, 2017

Abstract

This online appendix proves the central result in Lalley and Weyl (Forthcoming).

The full text PDF for "Qaudratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy" may be found here: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531.

Keywords: social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading

JEL Classification: D47, D61, D71, C72, D82, H41, P16

Suggested Citation

Lalley, Steven and Weyl, Eric Glen, An Online Appendix to 'Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy' (December 24, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2790624 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2790624

Steven Lalley

Department of Statistics, University of Chicago ( email )

Eckhart Hall Room 108
5734 S. University Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://galton.uchicago.edu/~lalley/

Eric Glen Weyl (Contact Author)

Microsoft Research New York City ( email )

641 Avenue of the Americas
7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States
8579984513 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com

RadicalxChange Foundation ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://www.radicalxchange.org

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