Salience and the Severity Versus the Certainty of Punishment

14 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2016 Last revised: 26 Jul 2016

See all articles by Murat C. Mungan

Murat C. Mungan

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: June 7, 2016

Abstract

The certainty aversion presumption (CAP) in the economics of law enforcement literature asserts that criminals are more responsive to increases in the certainty rather than the severity of punishment. In simple economic models, this presumption implies that criminals must be risk-seeking. Some scholars claim that this and similar anomalous implications are caused by the exclusion of various behavioral considerations in theoretical analyses. This article investigates whether a model in which criminals over-weigh probabilities attached to more salient outcomes (as in Bordalo et al. (2012) and (2013)) performs better than the simple expected utility theory model in explaining CAP-consistent-behavior. The analysis reveals that the answer is negative unless the probability of punishment is unreasonably high. This finding suggests that we should exercise caution in incorporating salience -- a la Bordalo et al. -- in simple law enforcement models.

Suggested Citation

Mungan, Murat C., Salience and the Severity Versus the Certainty of Punishment (June 7, 2016). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 16-28. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2790936 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2790936

Murat C. Mungan (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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