Making an Arranged Marriage Work: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 6, pp. 416-419, 2016
Posted: 8 Jun 2016
Date Written: June 6, 2016
In this note we analyze a simple game model of effort and time investment in an arranged marriage where the goal of the two partners making this investment is to create a better marital relationship. We first specify the best response functions of the two married partners. Next, we solve for the Nash equilibrium and then argue that this equilibrium is unique. Finally, we delineate an interesting connection between the two best response functions in our model and the corresponding best response functions in the well known two-player Cournot game.
Keywords: Arranged Marriage, Effort, Nash Equilibrium, Static Game, Strategic Complements
JEL Classification: J12, D13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation