Making an Arranged Marriage Work: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 6, pp. 416-419, 2016

Posted: 8 Jun 2016

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 6, 2016

Abstract

In this note we analyze a simple game model of effort and time investment in an arranged marriage where the goal of the two partners making this investment is to create a better marital relationship. We first specify the best response functions of the two married partners. Next, we solve for the Nash equilibrium and then argue that this equilibrium is unique. Finally, we delineate an interesting connection between the two best response functions in our model and the corresponding best response functions in the well known two-player Cournot game.

Keywords: Arranged Marriage, Effort, Nash Equilibrium, Static Game, Strategic Complements

JEL Classification: J12, D13

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., Making an Arranged Marriage Work: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (June 6, 2016). Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 6, pp. 416-419, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2791119

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

92 Lomb Memorial Drive
Rochester, NY 14623-5604
United States
585-475-2805 (Phone)
585-475-5777 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.rit.edu/aabgsh

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