Learning to Play Bayesian Games

26 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2001

See all articles by Eddie Dekel

Eddie Dekel

Northwestern University - Department of Economics; Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

Drew Fudenberg

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Date Written: July 2001

Abstract

This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about the distribution of Nature's move as well as learning about the opponents' strategies. A second goal is to argue that quite restrictive assumptions are necessary to justify the concept of Nash equilibrium without a common prior as a steady state of a learning process.

Suggested Citation

Dekel-Tabak, Eddie and Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K., Learning to Play Bayesian Games (July 2001). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1926. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=279233 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.279233

Eddie Dekel-Tabak

Northwestern University - Department of Economics ( email )

2003 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
(972) 3-6409715 (Phone)
(972) 3-6409908 (Fax)

Drew Fudenberg (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.dklevine.com

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

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