Financial Contagion in the Laboratory: Does Network Structure Matter?

Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking Vol 51, 2019, pp.1097-1136.

34 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2016 Last revised: 19 Aug 2020

See all articles by John Duffy

John Duffy

University of California, Irvine

Aikaterini Karadimitropoulou

University of East Anglia (UEA)

Melanie Parravano

University of Newcastle

Date Written: December 22, 2017

Abstract

We design and report on the first laboratory experiment exploring the role of interbank network structure and premature liquidation costs for the likelihood of a financial contagion. The laboratory provides the control necessary to understand the role played by interbank network configurations and liquidation costs for the fragility of the financial system. Specifically, we study the likelihood of financial contagion in complete and incomplete networks of banks that are linked in terms of interbank deposits as in the model of Allen and Gale (2000) and we further vary the cost of premature liquidation. Subjects play the role of depositors who must decide whether or not to withdraw their funds from their interconnected banks. We find that when liquidation costs are high, a complete network structure enabling efficient risk sharing is significantly less vulnerable to financial contagions than an incomplete network structure. However, when liquidation costs are low, network structure does not matter as much for the frequency of financial contagions. We conclude that low liquidation costs or a more complete network structure can be viewed as substitutes for reducing the frequency of financial contagions.

Keywords: Contagion, Networks, Experiments, Bank Runs, Interbank Deposits, Financial Fragility

JEL Classification: C92, E44, G21

Suggested Citation

Duffy, John and Karadimitropoulou, Aikaterini and Parravano, Melanie, Financial Contagion in the Laboratory: Does Network Structure Matter? (December 22, 2017). Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking Vol 51, 2019, pp.1097-1136., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2793099 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2793099

John Duffy (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine ( email )

Department of Economics
3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697
United States
949-824-8341 (Phone)

Aikaterini Karadimitropoulou

University of East Anglia (UEA) ( email )

Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom

Melanie Parravano

University of Newcastle ( email )

5 Barrack Road
Devonshire Building
NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE, 2308 NE1 7RU
United Kingdom

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