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Disclosure Policy in Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Stochastic Entry

32 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2016  

Qiang Fu

National University of Singapore (NUS)

Jingfeng Lu

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics

Jun Zhang

University of Technology Sydney

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 9, 2014

Abstract

We examine how disclosure policy can be optimally designed to incentivize contestants when their participation is exogenously stochastic. In a generalized Tullock contest setting with two players who are asymmetric in both their values and entry probabilities, we fully characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which no disclosure dominates full disclosure. We find that the comparison depends solely on a balance effect exercised by entry probabilities on the expected total effort. The optimal disclosure policy must better balance the competition. These conditions continue to hold when the precision r of Tullock contests is endogenously chosen by the designer.

Suggested Citation

Fu, Qiang and Lu, Jingfeng and Zhang, Jun, Disclosure Policy in Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Stochastic Entry (December 9, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2793645 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2793645

Qiang Fu

National University of Singapore (NUS) ( email )

Bukit Timah Road 469 G
Singapore, 117591
Singapore

Jingfeng Lu

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics ( email )

1 Arts Link, AS2 #06-02
Singapore 117570, Singapore 119077
Singapore

Jun Zhang (Contact Author)

University of Technology Sydney ( email )

EDG, School of Business
University of Technology Sydney
Sydney, NSW
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.zhangjun.weebly.com

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