The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests

33 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2016  

Jun Zhang

University of Technology Sydney

Ruqu Wang

Queen's University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 1, 2012

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. We establish that there exists no symmetric separating equilibrium under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very robust. We then characterize a partially efficient separating equilibrium under the partial revelation rule when players' valuations are uniformly distributed. We finally investigate the no revelation rule and find that it is both most efficient and optimal in maximizing the total efforts from the contestants. Within our framework, more information revelation leads to less efficient outcomes.

Keywords: elimination contests, incomplete information, information revelation

JEL Classification: D44, D72, D82, J31, L22

Suggested Citation

Zhang, Jun and Wang, Ruqu, The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests (December 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2793647 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2793647

Jun Zhang (Contact Author)

University of Technology Sydney ( email )

EDG, School of Business
University of Technology Sydney
Sydney, NSW
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.zhangjun.weebly.com

Ruqu Wang

Queen's University - Department of Economics ( email )

99 University Avenue
Kingston K7L 3N6, Ontario
Canada K7L 3N6

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