The Use of Leniency in EU Cartel Enforcement: An Assessment after Twenty Years

45 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2016 Last revised: 13 Oct 2016

Wouter P. J. Wils

King's College London; European Commission

Date Written: June 10, 2016

Abstract

Since 1996, the European Commission has been operating a leniency programme, under which companies cooperating with its cartel investigations can obtain immunity from fines or a reduction of fines. Leniency plays a prominent role in EU cartel enforcement today. This paper assesses the positive effects and the possible negative effects of leniency, in the light of twenty years of experience.

Keywords: cartels, antitrust, enforcement, EU, leniency, recidivism

JEL Classification: K00, K14, K21, K33, K42, L40

Suggested Citation

Wils, Wouter P. J., The Use of Leniency in EU Cartel Enforcement: An Assessment after Twenty Years (June 10, 2016). World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2016; King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 2016-29. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2793717

Wouter P. J. Wils (Contact Author)

King's College London

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

European Commission ( email )

Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

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