Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2793727
 


 



Finding Nemo: Locating Financial Losses after Kolassa/Barclays Bank and Profit


Matthias Haentjens


Leiden University - Leiden Law School

Dorine Verheij


Leiden University - Leiden Law School

June 10, 2016

M. Haentjens & D.J. Verheij, ‘Finding Nemo: Locating Financial Losses after Kolassa/Barclays Bank and Profit’, JIBLR 2016-6, p. 346-358
Leiden Law School Research Paper
Hazelhoff Research Paper Series No. 8

Abstract:     
This contribution concerns prospectus liability and critically analyses the CJEU’s recent Kolassa and Profit judgments as well as pending case Universal Music. The authors argue that jurisdiction and choice of law clauses in a prospectus must be upheld and that Kolassa is wrong to conclude that there is no agreement and no freely assumed legal obligation between the issuer and the (ultimate) investor. Moreover, they propose a radical new approach to the location of financial losses.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: 7(2) Brussels I Regulation, CJEU, conflict of laws, financial law, financial losses, Kolassa/Barclays Bank, location of financial losses, Private international law, Profit Investment/Ossi et al., prospectus liability, Universal Music International Holding BV/X


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Date posted: June 13, 2016  

Suggested Citation

Haentjens, Matthias and Verheij, Dorine, Finding Nemo: Locating Financial Losses after Kolassa/Barclays Bank and Profit (June 10, 2016). M. Haentjens & D.J. Verheij, ‘Finding Nemo: Locating Financial Losses after Kolassa/Barclays Bank and Profit’, JIBLR 2016-6, p. 346-358; Leiden Law School Research Paper; Hazelhoff Research Paper Series No. 8. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2793727

Contact Information

Matthias Haentjens
Leiden University - Leiden Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 9520
2300 RA Leiden, NL-2300RA
Netherlands
Dorine Verheij (Contact Author)
Leiden University - Leiden Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 9520
2300 RA Leiden, NL-2300RA
Netherlands
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