Conditional Privacy Rights

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 16-29

17 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2016 Last revised: 26 Oct 2016

See all articles by Murat C. Mungan

Murat C. Mungan

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: June 12, 2016

Abstract

People have subjective valuations of privacy. Thus, absent further considerations, efficiency requires that a person be afforded privacy if, and only if, his subjective valuation of privacy exceeds the social value of the information that would be disclosed through a violation of that person's privacy. Absolute regimes that either always allow privacy, or never allow privacy, cannot achieve this result. This article shows that a conditional privacy regime can lead to efficient separation among people based on their subjective valuations of privacy. Moreover, this regime need not inefficiently distort information collection incentives or incentives to refrain from various acts that may generate collectible information.

Suggested Citation

Mungan, Murat C., Conditional Privacy Rights (June 12, 2016). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 16-29. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2794651 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2794651

Murat C. Mungan (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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