Paths of Recruitment: Rational Social Prospecting in Petition Canvassing

72 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2016 Last revised: 13 Jul 2016

See all articles by Clayton Nall

Clayton Nall

Stanford University

Benjamin Schneer

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Daniel Carpenter

Harvard University

Date Written: June 20, 2016

Abstract

Petition canvassers are political recruiters. Building upon the rational prospector model, we theorize that rational recruiting strategies are dynamic (Bayesian and time-conscious), spatial (constrained by geography) and social (conditioned on relations between canvasser and prospect). Our theory predicts that canvassers will exhibit homophily in their canvassing preferences and will alternate between "door- to-door” and “attractor” (working in a central location) strategies based upon systematic geographical variation. They will adjust their strategies midstream (mid-petition) based upon experience. Introducing methods to analyze canvassing data, we test these hypotheses on geocoded signatory lists from two petition drives — a 2005-2006 anti-Iraq War initiative in Wisconsin and an 1839 antislavery campaign in New York City. Canvassers in these campaigns exhibited homophily to the point of following geographically and politically “inefficient” paths. In the aggregate, these patterns may exacerbate political inequality, limiting political involvement of the poorer and less educated.

Keywords: Political Recruitment, Petitions, Homophily

Suggested Citation

Nall, Clayton and Schneer, Benjamin and Carpenter, Daniel, Paths of Recruitment: Rational Social Prospecting in Petition Canvassing (June 20, 2016). Political Networks Workshops & Conference 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795336 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2795336

Clayton Nall

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Benjamin Schneer (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Daniel Carpenter

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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