Repo Regret?

WFA 2016 Park City, UT

71 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2016 Last revised: 19 Jan 2020

Date Written: March 19, 2019

Abstract

Non-bank mortgage originators, which operate through the originate-to-distribute (OTD) model, account for more than half of all the mortgage origination in the U.S. However, less is known about which factors drive the quality and quantity of mortgage originations through non-banks. I show that an exogenous shock that increased creditor protection for funding intermediaries of non-bank mortgage originators led to a greater issuance of riskier mortgages that culminated in 10--30\% higher ex post defaults. Overall, the results show how the quality of mortgage origination in the OTD model of non-banks can be managed by varying the monitoring incentives of their funding intermediaries. These results contrast with the common view that non-bank mortgage originators generally lack screening incentives due to their over-reliance on the OTD market and lower regulatory oversight.

Keywords: Mortgages, Mortgage Companies, Securitization, Warehouse Financing, Repos, Repurchase Agreements, Bankruptcy, Bankruptcy Act, 2008 Financial Crisis

JEL Classification: G21, G23, G28, G32, G33

Suggested Citation

Ganduri, Rohan, Repo Regret? (March 19, 2019). WFA 2016 Park City, UT. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795340 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2795340

Rohan Ganduri (Contact Author)

Emory University ( email )

1300 Clifton Rd
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

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