Why is Sentience so Hardly Explicable?

30 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2016 Last revised: 3 Aug 2016

See all articles by David Navon

David Navon

University of Haifa - Department of Psychology

Date Written: June 14, 2016

Abstract

Whereas cognitive science presently has a reasonably fair idea of how cognitions could be generated, how phenomenal experiences might be brought about is yet a puzzle. This issue is addressed here. It is proposed that although the causal chains bearing various types of experience are quite likely to be eventually exposed by neuropsychological studies, their end products are in a sense arbitrarily related to their specific environmental sources: While any product of the cognitive system is directed to something in the mind’s environment, products of sentience are not necessarily directed. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that it is mind-created. Possibly, the emergence of phenomenal experience in any specific occasion may be mediated by processes resorting to phenomenal elements associated with that occasion that are retrieved out of a pre-stored inventory.

Keywords: Awareness, Consciousness, Phenomenal Experience, Sentience

Suggested Citation

Navon, David, Why is Sentience so Hardly Explicable? (June 14, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795688 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2795688

David Navon (Contact Author)

University of Haifa - Department of Psychology ( email )

Complex, Room 7080
Mount Carmel Haifa, 3498838
Israel

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
41
Abstract Views
380
PlumX Metrics