Information Manipulation in Election Campaigns

35 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2016

See all articles by Kemal Kivanç Aköz

Kemal Kivanç Aköz

New York University (NYU) - New York University Abu Dhabi

Cemal Eren Arbatli

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: July 2016

Abstract

We provide a game‐theoretical model of manipulative election campaigns with two political candidates and a Bayesian voter. The latter is uncertain about how good the candidates are. Candidates take unobservable, costly actions to manipulate voter's opinion about their positions. We show that if the candidates differ in campaigning efficiency, and the voter receives the biased campaign messages with some noise, then the cost‐efficient candidate can win the election with higher probability than her opponent even when she is ex‐post an inferior choice for the voter. Our paper offers a novel informational justification for imposing limits on campaign spending and encouraging diversity in the supply of political information.

Suggested Citation

Aköz, Kemal Kivanç and Arbatli, Cemal Eren, Information Manipulation in Election Campaigns (July 2016). Economics & Politics, Vol. 28, Issue 2, pp. 181-215, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2796365 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12076

Kemal Kivanç Aköz (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - New York University Abu Dhabi

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

Cemal Eren Arbatli

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

26 Shabolovka Street
1215
Moscow, 119049
Russia

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/erenarbatli/home

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