Market Integration and Legal Federalism in the EU

Ruffert, M. (ed.), European Economy and People's Mobility: Project Conference of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence Jena. Stuttgart: Mohr Siebeck, 2016, pp 143-162

19 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2016

See all articles by Wolfgang Kerber

Wolfgang Kerber

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics

Date Written: January 15, 2016

Abstract

It is still an open and controversially discussed question to what extent harmonisation and centralisation of policies and regulations are necessary for the Internal Market of the EU. In this paper I argue that from an economic perspective the problem of market integration should not be analyzed only from the economic theory of international trade (with the main idea of removing non-tariff barriers to trade) but also from the economic theory of legal federalism, which also takes into account the advantages and problems of centralisation and decentralisation of policies and regulatory powers as well as regulatory competition. After a critical discussion of the economic concept of market integration (based upon international trade theory), an analytical framework for analyzing the optimal vertical allocation of regulatory powers (based upon economics of legal federalism) is presented, and briefly applied to the examples of corporate law and competition law.

Keywords: European Internal Market, market integration, legal federalism, harmonisation, regulatory competition

JEL Classification: F15, H70, K20, L40

Suggested Citation

Kerber, Wolfgang, Market Integration and Legal Federalism in the EU (January 15, 2016). Ruffert, M. (ed.), European Economy and People's Mobility: Project Conference of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence Jena. Stuttgart: Mohr Siebeck, 2016, pp 143-162. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2796585

Wolfgang Kerber (Contact Author)

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Am Plan 2
Marburg, D-35037
Germany
+49 6421 2823921 (Phone)

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