Sovereign Default Swap Market Efficiency and Country Risk in the Eurozone

53 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2016

See all articles by Yalin Gündüz

Yalin Gündüz

Deutsche Bundesbank

Orcun Kaya

ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences, School of Management and Law

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

This paper uses sovereign CDS spread changes and their volatilities as a proxy for the informational efficiency of the sovereign markets and persistency of country risks. Specifically, we apply semi-parametric and parametric methods to the sovereign CDSs of 10 eurozone countries to test the evidence of long memory behavior during the financial crisis. Our analysis reveals that there is no evidence of long memory for the spread changes, which indicates that the price discovery process functions efficiently for sovereign CDS markets even during the crisis. In contrast, both semi-parametric methods and the dual-parametric model imply persistent behavior in the volatility of changes for Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Belgium addressing persistent sovereign uncertainty. We provide evidence of causality from volatility in CDS prices to sovereign risk premiums for these peripheral economies. We furthermore demonstrate the potential spillover effects of spread changes among eurozone countries by estimating dynamic conditional correlations.

Keywords: credit default swaps, long memory, sovereign risk, eurozone economies, FIGARCH, dynamic conditional correlation

JEL Classification: C22, C58, G01, G15

Suggested Citation

Gündüz, Yalin and Kaya, Orcun, Sovereign Default Swap Market Efficiency and Country Risk in the Eurozone (2013). Bundesbank Discussion Paper No. 08/2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2796899 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2796899

Yalin Gündüz (Contact Author)

Deutsche Bundesbank ( email )

Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14
Frankfurt/Main, 60431
Germany

Orcun Kaya

ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences, School of Management and Law ( email )

Gertrudstrasse 8
Winterthur, 8400
Switzerland

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