Incentive Effects from Write-down CoCo Bonds: An Empirical Analysis

42 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2016 Last revised: 4 Jun 2018

Date Written: May 2018

Abstract

Departing from the principle of absolute priority, CoCo bonds are particularly exposed to bank losses despite not having ownership rights. This paper shows the link between adverse CoCo design and their yields, confirming the existence of market monitoring in designated bail-in debt. Specifically, focusing on the write-down feature as loss absorption mechanism in CoCo debt, I do find a yield premium on this feature relative to equity-conversion CoCo bonds as predicted by theoretical models. Moreover, and consistent with theories on moral hazard, I find this premium to be largest when existing incentives for opportunistic behavior are largest, while this premium is non-existent if moral hazard is perceived to be small. The findings show that write-down CoCo bonds introduce a moral hazard problem in the banks. At the same time, they support the idea of CoCo investors acting as monitors, which is a prerequisite for a meaningful role of CoCo debt in banks' regulatory capital mix.

Keywords: CoCo bonds, contingent capital, endogenous risk, capital structure, incentives, monitoring

JEL Classification: G18, G21, G32

Suggested Citation

Hesse, Henning, Incentive Effects from Write-down CoCo Bonds: An Empirical Analysis (May 2018). SAFE Working Paper No. 212. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2797203 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2797203

Henning Hesse (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

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