On Information Sharing and Incentives in R&D

Posted: 18 Sep 2001

See all articles by Sergei Severinov

Sergei Severinov

Duke University, Fuqua School of Business-Economics Group

Abstract

I investigate the issue of endogenous spillover of R&D information across firms through information exchange between their employees. Although the firms typically cannot observe and restrict communication between their employees in a direct way, they can regulate information flows through the incentive schemes offered to the employees. The article focuses on two issues: characterization of the optimal incentive schemes, and the link between the nature of the firms' interaction in the product market and the intensity of information exchange between the employees.

Suggested Citation

Severinov, Sergei, On Information Sharing and Incentives in R&D. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=279775

Sergei Severinov (Contact Author)

Duke University, Fuqua School of Business-Economics Group ( email )

Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0097
United States
919-660-7926 (Phone)
919-660-7971 (Fax)

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