Agency Finance in the Age of Executive Government

35 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2016

See all articles by Michael Greve

Michael Greve

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty; American Enterprise Institute (AEI)

Christopher DeMuth

Independent

Date Written: June 20, 2016

Abstract

The rise of “executive government” has prompted a great deal of public debate and scholarly theorizing. This article examines one aspect of that very large subject: agency budgets or, more precisely, revenues. To an unprecedented extent, regulatory agencies have come to rely on non-appropriated funds for their ordinary operations. Many have become self-financing; some have become profit centers for wider executive exertions — and for Congress. We trace this development in two areas: agencies’ delegated authority to tax, and agency finance through settlement with private parties in criminal or civil enforcement proceedings. Due to a paucity of reliable data, our presentation is necessarily sketchy and tentative. We nonetheless proceed (with the appropriate caution) in the hope of informing a scholarly debate over “the administrative state” that to our minds has become excessively abstract and formalistic. Agency self-finance bears on many of the central themes of administrative and constitutional law: delegation and the separation of powers; congressional oversight; agency independence; the choice between rulemaking and enforcement or adjudication; and judicial review. Approaching the administrative state from its most pedestrian front opens a window both into its actual operation and constitutional rule-of-law questions.

Keywords: administrative law, deferred prosecution agreements, delegation, financial regulation, settlements, spending power, tax power

JEL Classification: K2, K20, K23

Suggested Citation

Greve, Michael and DeMuth, Christopher, Agency Finance in the Age of Executive Government (June 20, 2016). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 16-25. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2798289 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2798289

Michael Greve (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

American Enterprise Institute (AEI) ( email )

1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Christopher DeMuth

Independent

No Address Available

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
149
Abstract Views
1,087
rank
194,318
PlumX Metrics