Politicising EU Lawmaking? The Spitzenkandidaten Experiment as a Cautionary Tale

17 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2016

See all articles by Marco Goldoni

Marco Goldoni

University of Glasgow - Faculty of Law & Financial Studies

Date Written: May 2016

Abstract

The Spitzenkandidaten experiment has elicited much interest in academic and political circles as a move towards further politicisation of important aspects of EU lawmaking. This article puts forward a sobering account of the normative and instrumental reasons that explain why these expectations were grounded on shaky premises and the experiment could not have delivered its promises. In particular, the article stresses (1) the failure in creating a channel for political opposition through the indirect election of the President of the Commission; (2) the adoption of a formal understanding of the institutions involved in the process, that is, a conception detached from their social basis and (3) the choice of the wrong institution for the purpose of politicisation. The article concludes with a modest proposal for the consolidation of the channels for political action already available at the level of the Member States.

Suggested Citation

Goldoni, Marco, Politicising EU Lawmaking? The Spitzenkandidaten Experiment as a Cautionary Tale (May 2016). European Law Journal, Vol. 22, Issue 3, pp. 279-295, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2798381 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12181

Marco Goldoni (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow - Faculty of Law & Financial Studies ( email )

Glasgow, Scotland
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/law/staff/marcogoldoni/#tabs=0

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