Anti-Discrimination Legislation and the Efficiency-Enhancing Role of Mandatory Parental Leave

45 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2016

See all articles by Spencer Bastani

Spencer Bastani

IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation; Linnaeus University - Department of Economics and Statistics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Tomer Blumkin

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Luca Micheletto

Bocconi University

Date Written: May 30, 2016

Abstract

We study a setting where anti-discrimination legislation gives rise to adverse selection in the labor market. Firms rely on nonlinear compensation contracts to screen workers who differ in their family/career orientation. This results in a labor market equilibrium where career-oriented workers are offered an inefficiently low duration of parental leave. In addition, family-oriented workers are offered lower wages as compared to their equally skilled career-oriented counterparts. We demonstrate the usefulness of mandatory parental leave rules in mitigating the distortion in the labor market and derive conditions under which a Pareto improvement is possible. We also characterize the optimal parental leave policy and highlight the possibility for parental leave legislation to eliminate the wage penalty of family-oriented workers by supporting pooling employment contracts.

Keywords: anti-discrimination, adverse selection, parental leave, efficiency

JEL Classification: D820, H210, J310, J830

Suggested Citation

Bastani, Spencer and Blumkin, Tomer and Micheletto, Luca, Anti-Discrimination Legislation and the Efficiency-Enhancing Role of Mandatory Parental Leave (May 30, 2016). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5917, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2798612

Spencer Bastani

IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation ( email )

Box 513
751 20 Uppsala
Sweden

Linnaeus University - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Växjö, 351 06
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Tomer Blumkin (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 2268 (Phone)
+972 8 647 2941 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Luca Micheletto

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti 25
20136 Milan, MI 20136
Italy

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