Inter Vivos Transfers of Ownership in Family Firms

37 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2016

See all articles by James R. Hines Jr.

James R. Hines Jr.

University of Michigan; NBER

Niklas Potrafke

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Marina Riem

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Christoph Schinke

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 01, 2016

Abstract

This paper examines the determinants of inter vivos (lifetime) transfers of ownership in German family firms between 2000 and 2013. Survey evidence indicates that owners of larger firms, and firms with strong current business conditions, transfer ownership at higher rates than others. When a firm’s self-described business condition improves from “normal” to “good” the likelihood of an inter vivos transfer increases by 46 percent. Inter vivos transfer rates also rose following a 2009 reform that reduced transfer taxes. These patterns suggest that transfer taxes significantly influence rates and timing of inter vivos ownership transfers.

Keywords: inter vivos transfers, transfer taxes, family firms

JEL Classification: H240, D310, D220

Suggested Citation

Hines, James Rodger and Potrafke, Niklas and Riem, Marina and Schinke, Christoph, Inter Vivos Transfers of Ownership in Family Firms (June 01, 2016). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5923. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2799201

James Rodger Hines

University of Michigan ( email )

625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States

NBER

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Niklas Potrafke (Contact Author)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

Marina Riem

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

Christoph Schinke

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
24
Abstract Views
333
PlumX Metrics