Influence Activities, Coalitions, and Uniform Policies
57 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2016 Last revised: 3 Jun 2017
Date Written: May 15, 2017
In this paper we examine a setting where agents can form lobbying coalitions to influence a policy-maker. Policy uniformity causes agents to free ride on each other's lobbying and gives them an incentive to form lobbying coalitions. We investigate when coalitions are formed by similar or dissimilar agents and show that endogenous coalition formation causes the effects of policy uniformity and lobbying costs on aggregate lobbying activity and policy strength to be non-monotonic. Finally, our model suggests that increased competition in the market for coalition-facilitating lobbyists can lead to less lobbying.
Keywords: Lobbies, Coalitions, One-Size-Fits-All, Regulation
JEL Classification: D72, G38, L51, M40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation