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Influence Activities, Coalitions, and Uniform Policies

57 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2016 Last revised: 3 Jun 2017

Henry L. Friedman

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Accounting Area

Mirko Stanislav Heinle

University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department

Date Written: May 15, 2017

Abstract

In this paper we examine a setting where agents can form lobbying coalitions to influence a policy-maker. Policy uniformity causes agents to free ride on each other's lobbying and gives them an incentive to form lobbying coalitions. We investigate when coalitions are formed by similar or dissimilar agents and show that endogenous coalition formation causes the effects of policy uniformity and lobbying costs on aggregate lobbying activity and policy strength to be non-monotonic. Finally, our model suggests that increased competition in the market for coalition-facilitating lobbyists can lead to less lobbying.

Keywords: Lobbies, Coalitions, One-Size-Fits-All, Regulation

JEL Classification: D72, G38, L51, M40

Suggested Citation

Friedman, Henry L. and Heinle, Mirko Stanislav, Influence Activities, Coalitions, and Uniform Policies (May 15, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2799992

Henry L. Friedman (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Accounting Area ( email )

D416 Anderson Complex
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

Mirko Stanislav Heinle

University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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