Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Genealogies of Cost-Benefit Analysis in TTIP's Regulatory Cooperation

Comparative European Politics Volume 15, special issue on Genealogies of European Governance (Mark Bevir and Ryan Phillips, eds.) (2017), Forthcoming

American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2016-26

29 Pages Posted: 28 Jun 2016 Last revised: 30 Sep 2016

Fernanda Nicola

American University - Washington College of Law

Date Written: June 10, 2016

Abstract

Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has become a quintessential tool in administrative law informing a variety of modes of regulatory governance. It provides a justification for the regulation of markets based on a quasi-scientific and seemly neutral logic to assess the impact of secondary legislation by government agencies. A new frontier for CBA is the promotion of trade liberalization. It features prominently in the regulatory chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). During the TTIP negotiations scholars have deployed CBA as a ‘neutral’ tool to achieve greater convergence, or reassert divergence and experimentalism in regulatory governance across the Atlantic. A genealogical examination reveals the existence of at least two strains of cost-benefit analyses in Western legal thought. A first one goes back to social orientations in private law translating into social-scientific expertise for regulators and proportionality for judges. A second one goes back to neoclassical economics in private law, translating into economic-scientific expertise for regulators and balancing for judges. Today scholars in their convergentist, divergentist or experimentalist approaches to governance deploy CBA and regulatory science as a neutral and quasi-scientific method to legitimize the subjection of national regulation to more demanding standards. A genealogical approach instead reveals that CBA is a contingent and open-ended regulatory tool that justifies contestable political decisions about regulatory strategies while allowing lawyers who apply CBA to remain agnostic on its distributive impact.

Keywords: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Regulation, Administrative Law, Genealogy, Welfare Economics, Chicago Law and Economics, Social Law, Judicial Balancing and Proportionality, Legal reasoning, Regulatory cooperation, Regulatory review, Red Tape, Transatlantic trade, TTIP

Suggested Citation

Nicola, Fernanda, Genealogies of Cost-Benefit Analysis in TTIP's Regulatory Cooperation (June 10, 2016). Comparative European Politics Volume 15, special issue on Genealogies of European Governance (Mark Bevir and Ryan Phillips, eds.) (2017), Forthcoming; American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2016-26. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2801093

Fernanda Giorgia Nicola (Contact Author)

American University - Washington College of Law ( email )

4300 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
48
Abstract Views
143