Efficiency Gains in Coordination in Information Poor Environments

24 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2016  

Stefano Balietti

Northeastern University - Network Science Institute; Harvard University - Institute for Quantitative Social Sciences; Northeastern University - Management Information Systems Area

Boris Jäggi

ETH Zurich

Kay W. Axhausen

ETH Zurich

Date Written: June 29, 2016

Abstract

This contribution shows that high-efficiency coordination via strategy sorting is possible even within a modest number of rounds and with minimal informational feedback. The results of our study challenge one of the widely established mechanisms to enhance coordination on high-efficiency equilibria, i.e. making them more “attractive” relative to lower efficiency equilibria (Devetag and Ortmann, 2007). In our study we show that there exist conditions under which the opposite is true, that is the more attractive the safer option is, the easier is to coordinate on high efficiency equilibria.

Keywords: coordination, congestion game, experiment, nodegame, uncertainty

JEL Classification: C92, D02

Suggested Citation

Balietti, Stefano and Jäggi, Boris and Axhausen, Kay W., Efficiency Gains in Coordination in Information Poor Environments (June 29, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802049 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802049

Stefano Balietti (Contact Author)

Northeastern University - Network Science Institute ( email )

177 Huntington Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02115
United States

Harvard University - Institute for Quantitative Social Sciences ( email )

1737 Cambridge St
Cambridge, MA 02115
United States

Northeastern University - Management Information Systems Area ( email )

Boston, MA 02115
United States

Boris Jäggi

ETH Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 101
ZUE F7
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

Kay W. Axhausen

ETH Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 101
ZUE F7
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

Paper statistics

Downloads
11
Abstract Views
219