24 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2016
Date Written: June 29, 2016
This contribution shows that high-efficiency coordination via strategy sorting is possible even within a modest number of rounds and with minimal informational feedback. The results of our study challenge one of the widely established mechanisms to enhance coordination on high-efficiency equilibria, i.e. making them more “attractive” relative to lower efficiency equilibria (Devetag and Ortmann, 2007). In our study we show that there exist conditions under which the opposite is true, that is the more attractive the safer option is, the easier is to coordinate on high efficiency equilibria.
Keywords: coordination, congestion game, experiment, nodegame, uncertainty
JEL Classification: C92, D02
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Balietti, Stefano and Jäggi, Boris and Axhausen, Kay W., Efficiency Gains in Coordination in Information Poor Environments (June 29, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802049 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802049