On the Optimal Disclosure of Queue Length Information

27 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2016 Last revised: 21 Jul 2020

See all articles by Kaili Li

Kaili Li

Beijing Jiaotong University

Shiliang Cui

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business

Jinting Wang

Beijing Jiaotong University; Central University of Finance and Economics

Date Written: May 1, 2017

Abstract

Simhon et al. (2016) proved that disclosing queue length to customers when the queue is shorter than some threshold and concealing the information otherwise cannot maximize the throughout of M/M/1 queues---when customers are familiar with the policy and the threshold. We show that said policy indeed maximizes throughput when customers do not have information of the policy. Furthermore, we prove that the socially optimal disclosure policy under this setting contains a “hole,” that is, it is socially optimal to disclose queue length to the customers when the queue is sufficiently short or sufficiently long but not disclose otherwise.

Keywords: Information disclosure, Queueing game, Throughput optimization, Social optimum

Suggested Citation

Li, Kaili and Cui, Shiliang and Wang, Jinting, On the Optimal Disclosure of Queue Length Information (May 1, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802172 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802172

Kaili Li

Beijing Jiaotong University ( email )

No.3 of Shangyuan Residence Haidian District
Beijing, 100089
China

Shiliang Cui (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Jinting Wang

Beijing Jiaotong University ( email )

No.3 of Shangyuan Residence Haidian District
Beijing, 100089
China

Central University of Finance and Economics ( email )

Beijing, Beijing 100081
China

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