Law Is a Battlefield: The Colonel Blotto Litigation Game

17 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2016 Last revised: 13 Dec 2016

See all articles by F. E. Guerra-Pujol

F. E. Guerra-Pujol

University of Central Florida; Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico

Date Written: December 12, 2016

Abstract

In this paper, we model litigation as a series of strategic contests. Specifically, building on the work of others, we model pre-trial litigation as a Colonel Blotto game, i.e. a game of allocative strategic mismatch in which the parties must allocate scarce time resources to a finite number of contests. Although the original version of the Colonel Blotto began as a game of military strategy, this game is relevant to any domain in which competitors must allocate scarce resources to a finite number of contests, including litigation. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a simple model of allocative strategic mismatch. Section 3 then presents our Colonel Blotto model of the litigation game, while Section 4 presents a specific and simple numerical example to illustrate the choice of strategies and the role of randomness in our model. Next, Section 5 describes litigation as a series of all-pay auctions. Section 6 concludes.

Keywords: Colonel Blotto, all-pay auction, strategy

JEL Classification: K41

Suggested Citation

Guerra-Pujol, F. E., Law Is a Battlefield: The Colonel Blotto Litigation Game (December 12, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802290 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802290

F. E. Guerra-Pujol (Contact Author)

University of Central Florida ( email )

Orlando, FL 32816
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.priorprobability.com

Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico ( email )

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