Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives

113 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2016 Last revised: 19 Aug 2022

See all articles by Miguel Anton

Miguel Anton

University of Navarra, IESE Business School

Florian Ederer

Boston University - Markets, Public Policy, and Law; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Mireia Gine

IESE Business School, University of Navarra ; The University of Pennsylvania

Martin C. Schmalz

CEPR; University of Oxford - Finance; CESifo; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 29, 2021

Abstract

We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industry and intra-firm cross-market variation in prices, output, markups, and market shares that is consistent with empirical evidence. The organizational structure of multiproduct firms and the passivity of common owners determine whether higher prices under common ownership result from higher costs or from higher markups. Using panel regressions and a difference-in-differences design we document that managerial incentives are less performance-sensitive in firms with more common ownership.

Keywords: Common ownership, competition, managerial incentives, productivity, corporate governance, antitrust

JEL Classification: M12, L13, J33, G32, D21, L21

Suggested Citation

Anton, Miguel and Ederer, Florian and Gine, Mireia and Schmalz, Martin C. and Schmalz, Martin C., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (March 29, 2021). Journal of Political Economy, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 511/2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802332 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802332

Miguel Anton

University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Florian Ederer

Boston University - Markets, Public Policy, and Law ( email )

Boston, MA
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Mireia Gine

IESE Business School, University of Navarra ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

The University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Martin C. Schmalz (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Finance ( email )

United States

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
8,326
Abstract Views
42,945
Rank
1,216
PlumX Metrics