Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
78 Pages
Posted: 3 Jul 2016
Last revised: 23 Jun 2017
IESE Business School, Universidad de Navarra
Yale University - School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation
IESE Business School, University of Navarra ; The University of Pennsylvania
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
There are 2 versions of this paper
Date Written: August 15, 2016
Abstract
We show theoretically and empirically that executives are paid less for their own firm's performance and more for their rivals' performance if an industry's firms are more commonly owned by the same set of investors. Higher common ownership also leads to higher unconditional total pay. We exploit quasi-exogenous variation in common ownership from a mutual fund trading scandal to support a causal interpretation. These findings challenge conventional assumptions in the corporate finance literature about the objective function of the firm.
Keywords: Common ownership, competition, CEO pay, management incentives, governance
JEL Classification: D21, G30, G32, J31, J41
Suggested Citation:
Suggested Citation
Anton, Miguel and Ederer, Florian and Gine, Mireia and Schmalz, Martin C., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (August 15, 2016). Ross School of Business Paper No. 1328; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 511/2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802332 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802332
