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Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives

60 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2016 Last revised: 2 Feb 2018

Miguel Anton

IESE Business School, Universidad de Navarra

Florian Ederer

Yale School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Mireia Gine

IESE Business School, University of Navarra ; The University of Pennsylvania

Martin C. Schmalz

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business; CEPR; CESifo

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2018

Abstract

We show theoretically and empirically that managers have steeper financial incentives to exert effort and reduce costs when an industry's firms are controlled by shareholders with concentrated stakes in the firm, and relatively few holdings in competitors. A side effect of steeper incentives is more aggressive competition. These findings inform a debate about the objective function of the firm.

Keywords: Common ownership, competition, CEO pay, management incentives, governance

JEL Classification: D21, G30, G32, J31, J41

Suggested Citation

Anton, Miguel and Ederer, Florian and Gine, Mireia and Schmalz, Martin C., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (February 2018). Ross School of Business Paper No. 1328; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 511/2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802332 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802332

Miguel Anton

IESE Business School, Universidad de Navarra ( email )

08034 Barcelona
Spain

Florian Ederer

Yale School of Management ( email )

165 Whitney Avenue
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.som.yale.edu/florianederer/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Mireia Gine

IESE Business School, University of Navarra ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

The University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Martin C. Schmalz (Contact Author)

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan St
R5456
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States
7347630304 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/martincschmalz/

CEPR ( email )

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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